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SUA SPONTE ACTIONS IN THE APPELLATE COURTS:
THE “GORILLA RULE” REVISITED
Ronald J. Offenkrantz* and Aaron S. Lichter**
The appellate judges returned an order su[a] sponte, or
without request from either party, to remove Judge
Scheindlin from the case. Legal experts couldn’t recall
another case in which a federal judge was removed without
1
a request from the litigants.

I. INTRODUCTION
This article illuminates the problems associated with sua
sponte appellate court actions and provides some suggested
solutions to the issues they create. A recent high-profile example
of sua sponte action occurred in 2013, when the Second Circuit
removed Judge Shira Scheindlin from further proceedings in two
stop-and-frisk cases2 because Judge Scheindlin

11/10/2016 09:41:10

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2016)

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 61 Side A

*A.B. Brown University, 1958; LL.B. Columbia University School of Law, 1961; LL.M.
New York University School of Law, 1964. Mr. Offenkrantz is a member of Lichter
Gliedman Offenkrantz PC, New York City.
**A.B. University of Chicago, 2014; J.D. expected 2017, New York University School of
Law. The authors would like to extend their gratitude to Professor Deborah S. Gordon,
Drexel University, Thomas R. Kline School of Law, for her invaluable comments on an
earlier draft of this article. The authors are also grateful to Professor Robert J. Martineau,
whose work inspired their title and some portions of their analysis. See Robert J.
Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1987) (noting that “appellate courts, like gorillas, are subject to
few restraints except those that are self-imposed”).
1. Sean Gardiner, Judge Fights Back against Fellow Judges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7,
2013, at A21 (referring to proceedings in stop-and-frisk case heard by Judge Shira
Scheindlin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York).
2. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d
362 (2d Cir. 2014); Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The
plaintiffs in Floyd challenged the constitutionality of the New York City Police
Department’s stop-and-frisk policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at
557. Judge Scheindlin ruled in August 2013 that the City and the NYPD were “liable for
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ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
Canon 2 (“A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.”) . . . and . . . the
appearance of impartiality surrounding this litigation was
compromised by the District Judge’s improper application
of the Court’s “related case rule,” . . . and by a series of
media interviews and public statements purporting to
3
respond publicly to criticism of the District Court.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id. at 562. Ligon was a
related case challenging a “narrow subset” of the policy on the ground that it violated the
Fourth Amendment. Ligon, 288 F.R.D. at 77.
3. Ligon, 538 F. App’x at 102–03 (footnote and citations omitted).
4. Req. for Leave to File Mot. to Address Order of Disqualification at 6, Ligon v. City
of N.Y. and Floyd v. City of N.Y., http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY0014-0009.pdf (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2013) (No. 13-3088 & No. 13-3123) [hereinafter Neuborne
Request].
5. Id. at 9.
6. See id. at 6–8; see also Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (providing that “[a] party
petitioning for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directed to a court . . . must also provide
a copy to the trial-court judge”); Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)(4) (providing that “[t]he court of
appeals may invite or order the trial-court judge to address the petition or may invite an
amicus curiae to do so,” and that “[t]he trial court judge may request permission to address
the petition”).
7. Neuborne Request, supra note 4, at 9.
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According to her lawyers’ motion for leave to appear on the
judge’s behalf, that statement was the “functional equivalent of a
judicial finding that [Judge Scheindlin] behaved improperly,”4
while the order itself “completely blind-sided” Judge
Scheindlin.5 By acting sua sponte, the Second Circuit deprived
Judge Scheindlin of the protections granted to trial judges by
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provides that trial judges accused of judicial misconduct must be
given both notice of the charges against them and an opportunity
to be heard before the appellate court.6 Indeed, the Second
Circuit’s behavior was not only “a breach of the norms of
collegiality and mutual respect that should characterize
interactions between District and Circuit judges, [but] an affront
to the values underlying the Fifth Amendment’s guaranty of
procedural due process of law.”7
Moreover, as the amici curiae in Ligon and Floyd pointed
out, the Second Circuit’s rationale regarding Judge Scheindlin’s
“appearance of partiality” was based on an inaccurately reported
2007 colloquy between Judge Scheindlin and plaintiffs’ counsel
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from a related case, and on statements reported in three news
articles but never actually made by Judge Scheindlin.8 Although
the Second Circuit later clarified that it did not mean to imply
that Judge Scheindlin had engaged in misconduct, it upheld the
reassignment, and reiterated its belief that “there [was] no
barrier to our reassigning the cases nostra sponte.”9
The high-profile nature of the case, and of the stop-andfrisk policy in general, meant that Judge Scheindlin’s sua sponte
removal was widely reported in the press.10 In effect,
newspapers were reporting that appellate courts had carte
blanche to raise and decide important issues in a case without
ever seeking the input of any of the parties to it.
The chain of events surrounding Judge Scheindlin’s
removal represents only a subcategory of the problems
surrounding sua sponte actions in the appellate courts.11 In
addition to being freely able to question the ethics of a respected
judge without a complaint from any of the parties, appellate
courts are free to decide cases on principles that were never

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 62 Side A
11/10/2016 09:41:10

8. See id. at 10–14; Br. for Six Retired U.S. Dist. Ct. Judges and Thirteen Professors
of Legal Ethics as Amici Curiae Supporting Plfs-Appellees’ Mot. for Recons. by the En
Banc Ct. at iv–vi, In re Reassignment of Cases (Ligon and Floyd), http://www.ccr
justice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Retired%20Fed%20Judges%20Amicus%20Br%20
ISO%20of%20Mot%20for%20En%20Banc%20Reconsid.pdf (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2013)
(showing that the amici included Judges Cindrich, Coar, Fergeson, Gertner, Holwell, and
Sporkin, and Professors Bernstein, Buckler, Freedman, Gershman, Green, Harrison, Klein,
Lynk, Margulies, Raful, Rhode, Roiphe, and Wendel).
9. In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part sub
nom Ligon v. City of N.Y., 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal Panel Softens Tone on
Judge It Removed From Stop-and-Frisk Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, at A28;
Gardiner, supra note 1; Emily Bazelon, Shut Up, Judge! A Misguided Appeals Court Tries
to Silence—and Quash—Stop-and-Frisk Judge Shira Scheindlin, SLATE (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/nypd_ and _judge_
shira_scheindlin_2nd_circuit_appeals_court_judges_try_to.html; Josh Saul, Scheindlin
Could Face Reprimand after Stop-Frisk Rebuke, N.Y. POST (Nov. 1, 2013), http://nypost
.com/2013/11/01/scheindlin-could-face-reprimand-after-stop-frisk-rebuke/; Jeffrey Toobin,
The Preposterous Removal of Judge Scheindlin, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www
.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-preposterous-removal-of-judge-scheindlin; see also
Katherine Macfarlane, Analyzing the Southern District of New York’s Amended “Related
Cases” Rule: The Process for Challenging Nonrandom Case Assignment Remains
Inadequate, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 701 n.2 (2014) (listing editorials criticizing
Judge Scheindlin’s removal).
11. The authors use the phrase “sua sponte action” to refer to instances in which an
appellate court raises an issue, decides an issue, or grants relief on its own motion. This
article focuses primarily on sua sponte actions related to substantive issues.
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argued and grant relief that was not sought by any litigant.12
Commentators have criticized sua sponte actions on multiple
grounds,13 most notably on the basis that they deprive litigants
of their right to procedural due process.14
This article builds on prior scholarship by arguing that
allowing an appellate court to reach out and grant relief not
requested, based on arguments not made, both disserves the
litigants and exercises a power that appellate courts should be
loath to use, and by focusing attention on recent cases which
highlight the continuing problem. Part II of this Article discusses
the historical development of American appellate procedure,
including how sua sponte actions derived from equity rather
than the common law. Part III reviews current Supreme Court
and state court jurisprudence regarding appellate court sua
sponte actions. Part IV considers the negative consequences of
appellate court sua sponte actions, examining some particularly
striking cases and the due process implications of courts making
sua sponte decisions. Part V considers some practical reforms to
appellate court procedure, designed to mitigate the negative
consequences of sua sponte actions.
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12. See Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants
of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1280–86 (2002) (listing
fifteen grounds on which appellate courts act sua sponte, including a category called “For
No Reason at All”). Other types of sua sponte actions on appeal have only recently
attracted attention. In particular, nine of the thirteen federal courts of appeals have used a
procedure known as “mini” or “informal” en banc review, wherein one panel submits an
opinion to the full court for acquiescence in place of formal en banc review. Amy E. Sloan,
The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 725–28 (2009); see also Steven M.
Witzel & Samuel P. Groner, Mini-En Banc Review in the Second Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7,
2016, at 5, 8. This procedure effectively allows a panel to overrule circuit precedents with
no opportunity for the litigants to be heard, and without anyone’s knowledge that the
practice is even occurring. Sloan, supra this note, at 758–59. Informal en banc review is
often used in the Second and Seventh Circuits, where the procedure is more common than
formal en banc rehearing. Id. at 727–28 (noting that, from 1966 to 2007, the Second Circuit
employed informal en banc review seventy-one times, and formal en banc review only
fifty-two times, and that from 1969 to 2007 the Seventh Circuit used informal en banc
review 272 times, and formal en banc review only 196 times).
13. See, e.g., Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at
Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 262–90 (2002)
(providing three criticisms of sua sponte decisions by appellate courts); Miller, supra note
12, at 1288–96 (arguing that sua sponte decisions violate due process).
14. See e.g. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 262–71 (arguing that appellate court sua
sponte decisions are “inconsistent with fundamental principles of due process”); Miller,
supra note 12, at 1288–96.
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II. SUA SPONTE ACTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Modern appellate courts derive their power to take actions
sua sponte from equity.15 In the ancient English legal system, the
House of Lords, which served as the appellate court in equity,
had the power to review any issue of law or fact regardless of
whether it was in the record,16 and could “render any type of
judgment it thought justice demanded.”17 By contrast, the
principal procedure for appellate review at common law, known
as the “writ of error,” limited the appellate court’s authority to
questions of law raised and decided at the trial court level and
prevented the appellate court from ruling on any question not
reflected in the record.18 “Appellate courts were not free to raise
new issues sua sponte; issues not assigned as error were
waived.”19 Trials under the writ of error ultimately reflected the
idea of the “adversary process,” under which the litigants rather
than the court controlled the issues in the case.20
The writ of error became the primary basis for appellate
review early in United States history. Multiple sections of the
federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for appellate review by
writ of error, and Congress later provided that appeals in equity
were to be “subject to the same rules, regulations, and
restrictions” as writs of error.21 Thus, “appellate procedure in
this country became set in the mold of procedure on writ of error
at common law.”22
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 63 Side A
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15. See Miller, supra note 12, at 1263–64 (discussing traditional separation between
law courts and courts of equity).
16. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
CIVIL APPEALS 5 (1983). See also Miller, supra note 12, at 1263 (noting that “equity
developed flexible procedures to meet the needs of individual cases,” including “the device
of rehearing, which allowed the court to address new facts or law not originally raised by
the parties”).
17. Martineau, supra note **, at 1027 (discussing historic powers of courts of equity).
18. Id. at 1026–28. A related device called a “bill of exceptions” was used if an
appellant wanted to raise an issue in the appellate court that was not contained within the
trial record. Id.
19. Miller, supra note 12, at 1263.
20. See Miller, supra note 12, at 1262–63; see Martineau, supra note **, at 1026–28.
21. ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 108 (1941) (citation
omitted).
22. Id.
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Although law and equity have been merged in the federal
system and in most state courts, current American appellate
procedures still are “overtly based on the principles of writ of
error review at common law, rather than the appeal in equity,”
and therefore emphasize the adversary process.23 Sua sponte
actions, derived as they are from equity, accordingly are
incongruous with current principles of appellate review.24
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACHES TO SUA SPONTE ACTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND IN STATE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach
The Supreme Court has thus far refrained from placing
direct limitations on appellate courts’ discretion to act sua
sponte, although it has provided some loose guidelines for
appellate courts to follow. Perhaps the Court is unwilling to
criticize or circumscribe this approach because the Court itself
routinely raises issues sua sponte.25 Singleton v. Wulff 26
encapsulates the Court’s approach towards sua sponte actions in
the federal courts of appeals: applying the Gorilla Rule.27 In
Singleton, the Court addressed the question of when new issues
could be raised and decided in an appellate court, first noting
that “[i]t is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate
court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”28
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 63 Side B
11/10/2016 09:41:10

23. Miller, supra note 12, at 1264; see also Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556
(1941) (“Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised
below. For our procedural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial
forum vested with authority to determine questions of fact.”).
24. Appellate courts are “confused about the power to raise and decide issues sua
sponte” because of the conflict between law and equity. Miller, supra note 12, at 1262–63.
25. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
26. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
27. The term was coined by Professor Martineau, based on the riddle asking “Where
does an eight-hundred pound gorilla sleep?” and answering “Anywhere it wants.” As
Professor Martineau noted, “[t]he judicial application of this rule would be: ‘When will an
appellate court consider a new issue?’” and “[t]he response is: ‘Any time it wants.’”
Martineau, supra note **, at 1023 n.*.
28. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120. Sua sponte actions are a subgroup of this broader
category, which also includes new issues raised on appeal by one of the litigants. Cf.
Martineau, supra note **, at 1054 n.121 (“If a court can consider a question sua sponte, the
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However, the Court then acknowledged that “[t]he matter of
what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time
on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of
appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases,” and
that a court may be “justified in resolving an issue not passed on
below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or
where ‘injustice might otherwise result.’”29
Within the space of two paragraphs, the Supreme Court
therefore announced its general rule and abrogated it in favor of
the Gorilla Rule: An issue can be raised and decided for the first
time on appeal if the answer is beyond doubt, or—reflecting the
influence of equity—an “injustice might otherwise result.”30
And the Court recently upheld the Gorilla Rule in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker,31 stating that “[w]e have previously
stopped short of stating a general principle to contain appellate
courts’ discretion . . ., and we exercise the same restraint
today.”32
Supreme Court cases addressing sua sponte actions on
appeal have been squarely within Singleton’s framework. The
Supreme Court has held, for instance, that appellate courts
deciding pure questions of law may consider relevant precedent
not cited by any party at trial.33 The Court has also ruled that the
federal courts of appeals have broad discretion to raise new
issues sua sponte. In United States National Bank of Oregon v.
Independent Insurance Agents of America,34 for example,
although both parties assumed the validity of a particular statute,
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 64 Side A
11/10/2016 09:41:10

question can, of course, be raised by a party. The reverse, however, is not necessarily
true.”).
29. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
30. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 1278–79 (discussing Gorilla Rule).
31. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
32. Id. at 487 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit had decided that one of Exxon’s
claims should not have been treated as waived, even though Exxon had raised its argument
almost thirteen months after a stipulated motions deadline. The Supreme Court disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, but agreed with its decision because the Ninth Circuit
had discretion under Singleton to make it. Id. at 485–87.
33. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–12 (1994) (“This case presents the
question whether an appellate court . . . must disregard relevant legal authority not
presented to, or considered by, the court of first instance. We hold that appellate review . . .
is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or
discovered by, the district court.”).
34. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
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the D.C. Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of whether the
statute had been repealed, asked the parties to address the issue
at oral argument, and ordered supplemental briefing.35 When
neither party took a position on whether the statute was still
valid, the D.C. Circuit sua sponte decided that it was no longer
in force.36 The bank argued on certiorari that the D.C. Circuit
“lacked the authority to consider whether [the statute]
remain[ed] the law and, alternatively, that it had abused its
discretion in doing so.”37
Although the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit on
the merits,38 it held that “a court may consider an issue
‘antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of’ [a] dispute
before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.”39
Indeed, the Court held that the federal courts of appeals have the
ability sua sponte to reframe the issues presented by the
parties.40
The National Bank of Oregon Court also approved the D.C.
Circuit’s deciding the issue sua sponte because it gave the
parties “ample opportunity to address the issue.”41 Similarly, in
Trest v. Cain the Court indicated a preference for ordering
supplemental briefing when a new issue is raised sua sponte, but

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 64 Side B
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35. Id. at 444. The relevant statute had been enacted in 1916 and had been included in
the United States Code editions of 1934, 1940, and 1946. However, it was omitted from the
1952 edition, with a note that it had been repealed by Congress in 1918. Despite the
apparent repeal, Congress had assumed that the statute remained in force, and amended it
in 1982. Id. at 441–42.
36. Id. at 444–45.
37. Id. at 445.
38. See id. at 462–63.
39. Id. at 447 (quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)) (alterations
in original).
40. Id. at 447 (asserting that “[t]he contrary conclusion would permit litigants, by
agreeing on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts
of Congress or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to
characterize as anything but advisory”); see also Miller, supra note 12, at 1277–78
(analyzing National Bank of Oregon).
41. National Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 448. Professors Milani and Smith argue that
the holding in National Bank of Oregon is “Supreme Court authority for the proposition
that an appellate court abuses its judicial discretion when it not only raises an issue sua
sponte but decides that issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it.” Milani
& Smith, supra note 13, at 290 (emphasis in original). However, it is difficult to reconcile
this proposition with cases in which the Court declined to restrict appellate courts’ general
discretion to raise and decide issues sua sponte. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 92 (1997);
Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 487.
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stopped short of making supplemental briefing a requirement.42
In line with Trest, the Supreme Court often requests
supplemental briefs and additional oral argument when it raises
an issue sua sponte.43 Recent examples can be found in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,44 and National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,45 in which the Court raised a
jurisdictional issue sua sponte, directed the parties to brief and
argue it,46 and appointed an amicus to advance it when none of
the parties indicated support.47
Some of the Supreme Court’s most important cases have
been decided on issues raised sua sponte. The Erie Court48
overturned nearly 100 years of precedent—and eliminated an
entire category of federal law—without either being asked to do
so or giving the parties an opportunity to brief or argue the
issue.49 The Court acted comparably in Mapp v. Ohio,50

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 65 Side A
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42. See Trest, 522 U.S. at 92 (“We do not say that a court must always ask for further
briefing when it disposes of a case on a basis not previously argued. But often, as here, that
somewhat longer (and often fairer) way ’round is the shortest way home.”); see also Miller,
supra note 12, at 1298–1300. Coincidentally, the holding in Trest was that an appellate
court is not required to raise the issue of “procedural default” sua sponte. Trest, 522 U.S. at
89; see also Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 295–96 (analyzing Trest).
43. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 298 n.291 (collecting and describing cases in
which the Court raised an issue sua sponte, and proceeded to request supplemental briefing,
additional oral argument, or both); Miller, supra note 12, at 1298 (“[T]he Court itself often
directs supplemental briefing on issues it raises sua sponte, either when issuing the order
accepting questions for oral argument, or after argument.” (footnotes omitted)).
44. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
45. ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For the most recent example, see the order in
Zubik v. Burwell directing the parties to file supplemental briefs, which states the issues to
be analyzed, sets forth hypothetical questions to be answered, and invites the parties “to
address other proposals.” Order, Zubik v. Burwell, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/032916zr_3d9g.pdf (U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505,
15-35, 15-105, 15-119 & 15-191); see also Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
1557, 1560 (2016) (noting that “[i]n light of the positions asserted by the parties in their
supplemental briefs,” the Court vacated the judgments below and remanded the case).
46. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Fla., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011)
(mem.) (directing the parties to brief and argue the question of “[w]hether the suit brought
by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act”).
47. National Federation, 132 S. Ct. at 2582.
48. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842), and characterizing it as having invaded rights “reserved by the Constitution
to the several states”).
49. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 255–56 (discussing in detail the history of
the case and the Court’s decision); see Erie, 304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a
general rule, this Court will not consider any question not raised below and presented by
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applying the exclusionary rule to the states without any briefing
or argument on the issue.51 Similarly, in Kiobel, which
“involved one of the most important, contentious, and dynamic
aspects of U.S. foreign relations law,”52 the Court raised an
entirely different issue sua sponte during oral argument, called
for further briefing, held the case over to the next term, and
ultimately decided it on the basis of that new issue.53
It bears noting, however, that the Court stated in Hohn v.
United States54 that decisions in which “the opinion was
rendered without full briefing or argument”—a category that
includes decisions on issues raised sua sponte in which the court
does not request supplemental briefing—have a lower
precedential value.55 And Justice Souter once suggested that sua
sponte decisions should be treated as dicta.56

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 65 Side B
11/10/2016 09:41:10

the petition. Here it does not decide either of the questions presented, but, changing the rule
of decision in force since the foundation of the government, remands the case to be
adjudged according to a standard never before deemed permissible.”) (citations omitted).
50. 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and
holding that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is . . . inadmissible in a state court”).
51. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 672–73 & nn. 4–6 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
search-and-seizure issue, noting that it was neither the “central” nor “controlling issue in
the case, indicating that it had been raised only as a “subordinate” point, and referring to
counsel’s statement at oral argument that he was not asking the Court to overrule Wolf);
see also Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 257–59 (discussing the history of the case);
Miller, supra note 12, at 1255 & n.3. Neither party requested that the Supreme Court
overrule Wolf; an amicus brief filed by the ACLU in support of Mapp included a
concluding paragraph requesting that the Court overrule Wolf, but did not argue the point.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 673 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent With
International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2014). The issue in question
was “the ability of foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for extraterritorial violations of
customary international law . . . under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).” Id.
53. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (Roberts, C.J.) (explaining that “[a]fter oral argument,
we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing an additional question:
‘Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States,’” and that after hearing oral argument a second time, the Court
would affirm the judgment below “based on [its] answer to the second question”).
54. 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
55. Id. at 251 (characterizing the Court as “less constrained to follow precedent” in
these situations); accord Miller, supra note 12, at 1292.
56. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572–73
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (“I think a rule of law unnecessary to the outcome of a case,
especially one not put into play by the parties, approaches without more the sort of ‘dicta
. . . which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’”
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In a related phenomenon, individual Justices will
sometimes use their opinions to send signals about the sorts of
cases that they want to hear in the future.57 For example, Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg signaled recently that they wished to
consider the constitutionality of the death penalty, while Justice
Kennedy asked to hear a case about solitary confinement,58 and
the Court heard a case in the 2015 term brought in response to a
2012 signal from Justice Alito.59 This signaling process is
analogous to the Court’s raising an issue sua sponte and
requesting briefing on that issue, the main difference being that
cases brought in response to signals have to make their way to
the Court through the usual channels.
B. Approaches in the State Courts
State high courts have taken divergent positions on sua
sponte actions by intermediate appellate courts. Some states
parallel the Supreme Court and give appellate courts wide
discretion to raise issues sua sponte. For example, in City of
Seattle v. McCready,60 the Washington Supreme Court noted
that it had “the inherent discretionary authority to reach issues
not briefed by the parties if those issues are necessary for
decision.”61 Other states, in contrast, have preserved the general
rule that an appellate court should not raise or decide issues that
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 66 Side A
11/10/2016 09:41:10

(quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)). Justice Souter was
criticizing a previous rule announced in Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), which had been decided sua sponte. See Lukumi Bablu Aye, 508 U.S. at
572 (“[N]either party squarely addressed the proposition the Court was to embrace [in
Smith].”).
57. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, With Subtle Signals, Supreme Court Justices Request the
Cases They Want to Hear, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2015, at A14.
58. Id.
59. Id. (referring to Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. (2016)
(per curiam). Filing Friedrichs in response to that signal did not prove to be a winning
strategy. See Adam Liptak, Justices’ 4–4 Tie Gives Unions Win in Labor Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, at A1 (referring to the equally divided Court’s affirming of the
decision below after Justice Scalia’s then-recent death).
60. 868 P.2d 134 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
61. McCready, 868 P.2d at 138–39 (citations omitted); see also State v. Holmes, 315
N.W.2d 703, 707 (Wis. 1982) (“That a court should raise issues sua sponte is the natural
outgrowth of the court’s function to do justice between the parties. . . . [I]t is well
recognized that courts may sua sponte consider legal issues not raised by the parties.”)
(citation omitted).
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were not litigated in the trial court.62 Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recently stated that “when a court decides issues
sua sponte, it exceeds its proper appellate function and
unnecessarily disturbs the process of orderly judicial
decisionmaking.”63 Still others either strongly favor or overtly
mandate providing an opportunity for supplemental briefing
when a court raises an issue sua sponte.64
In general, though, it is difficult to know when a state
appellate court (or, for that matter, a federal appellate court) acts
sua sponte absent a reference in either the majority opinion or a
dissenting opinion noting that it occurred.65 When this is not the
case, evidence often can be found only in motions filed by
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62. See, e.g., Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980) (“The general rule that an appellate court will not review a question not raised
during the trial . . . also applies when the appellate court raises, sua sponte, an issue not
litigated below”) (citation omitted); People v. Hunt, 914 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ill. 2009) (“‘It is
established that the theory under which a case is tried in the trial court cannot be changed
on review.’ . . . This limitation is applicable to both the parties and the reviewing court.”)
(citation omitted); but see Clark A. Donat, Case Note, Every Attorney Deserves a Second
Chance: Consideration of Issues Not Raised at the Trial Court Level in Jones v. Flowers,
62 ARK. L. REV. 831, 831 (2009) (“Despite the general rule that arguments addressed on
appeal must have been raised below, in Jones v. Flowers the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered an argument that had not been raised and developed at the trial-court level. . . .
[T]his action . . . directly conflict[ed] with numerous prior rulings.” (footnotes omitted)).
63. Steiner v. Markel, 600 Pa. 515, 527 (2009).
64. See e.g. State v. Curry, 931 P.2d 1133, 1136–37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting
state’s argument that court “should not ask for assistance from the parties” when it raises
an issue sua sponte because “the state’s argument runs so counter to notions of procedural
due process and the status of counsel as officers of the court”); People ex rel. T.D., 140
P.3d 205, 215 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that a then-new state appellate rule explicitly
allows court to request supplemental briefing when it raises an issue sua sponte, but that
practice of requesting supplemental briefs was itself not new), overruled on other grounds,
People ex rel. A.J.L., 243 P.2d 244 (Colo. 2010) (en banc); Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide
v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc., 84 A.3d 840, 867–69 (Conn. 2014) (laying out
conditions under which an appellate court can raise an issue sua sponte, and stating that
when a court does so, it must provide for supplemental briefing).
65. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 313–14 (pointing out that “most courts that
raise issues sua sponte neither declare that they are doing so nor attempt to justify making a
decision without input from the parties”); Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in
Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 497–98 (1958). Recently, a spirited dissent
asserted that an Arkansas Supreme Court holding broke from the “clear precedent”
providing that the court would not raise an issue sua sponte unless it involved subjectmatter jurisdiction in the trial court, and in doing so “overrule[d] a line of cases dating back
nearly thirty years.” Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105 at 18 (Wynne, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 16 (noting that “without the aid of briefs and without having been requested to act,
this court overrules itself and reverses the circuit court, which properly followed our
longstanding precedent”) (Brill, C.J., dissenting).
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litigants aggrieved by the court’s action.66 For example, in Clark
v. Clark,67 the appellee filed a motion for reargument
complaining that she was “blindsided” when the court sua
sponte remanded three cases to a different court and county for
trial.68
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUA SPONTE ACTIONS ON APPEAL
The circumstances surrounding Judge Scheindlin’s
removal, and the outpouring of criticism it prompted,69 reinforce
the conclusion that “sua sponte decision of new issues has been
subject to the gorilla rule of unbridled discretion.”70 This section
examines sua sponte actions by intermediate appellate courts in
order to show the consequences of the Gorilla Rule: wasted
judicial resources, the appearance of untested and erroneous
rules of law, and deprivation of litigants’ rights to procedural
due process.
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66. Cf. Vestal, supra note 65, at 497 (“Unless there is a dissenting opinion noting the
fact, only the attorneys for the litigants will be aware that the court has decided the case on
issues not argued to the court.”) (footnote omitted).
67. 93 A.D.3d 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
68. Id. at 815 (discussing reasons for change of venue to be effected on remand);
Amended Notice of Motion for Reargument, or, in the Alternative, for Leave to Appeal to
the Court of Appeals at 20 n.4, 25, Clark v. Clark (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (Nos. 2010-2634
& 2010-8959) (on file with author Offenkrantz, who represented the defendant/appellant in
Clark); see also Misicki v. Caradonna, 909 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (N.Y. 2009) (“For us now
to decide this appeal on a distinct ground that we winkled out wholly on our own would
pose an obvious problem of fair play. We are not in the business of blindsiding litigants,
who expect us to decide their appeals on rationales advanced by the parties, not arguments
their adversaries never made.”).
69. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
70. Miller, supra note 12, at 1288 (footnote omitted).
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A. Appellate Courts Acting Sua Sponte Can Waste Resources,
Cause Confusion, and Create Bad Law
1. Anastasoff v. United States71
One argument against sua sponte actions is that they are
“an inefficient use of judicial resources,”72 as exemplified by
Anastasoff, in which a taxpayer sought a refund for overpayment
of federal income taxes. The IRS denied the claim as untimely
under Christie v. United States,73 an unpublished opinion in
which the Eighth Circuit had earlier “rejected precisely the same
legal argument.”74 Anastasoff contended that Christie was not
binding because unpublished opinions were not precedential
under Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i).75
The Eighth Circuit sua sponte declared that the relevant
portion of Rule 28A was unconstitutional,76 applied Christie to
the facts of Anastasoff, and affirmed the district court’s denial of
the claim.77 The Anastasoff court noted that Weisbart v.
Department of the Treasury,78 a then-recent Second Circuit
decision “appear[ed] to conflict with Christie,”79 but declined to
take a stance on whether it would follow Weisbart if “not for the
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71. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
72. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 286 n.213 (quoting Eric D. Miller, Note, Should
Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte? 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1050 (1998)).
Milani & Smith provide an excellent detailed analysis of the Anastasoff case and its
subsequent history. Id.
73. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20. 1992) (per curiam).
74. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d. at 899. The relevant statute limited refunds to taxes paid
within the three years prior to the filing of a claim. Although Anastasoff mailed her claim
within the three-year period, it “was received and filed three years and one day after she
overpaid her taxes.” Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 899–900 (noting that the law as declared in the decisions made by federal
courts “must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties,” and that Rule
28A(i) “purport[ed] to expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III,” making
it unconstitutional); see Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 286 n.213 (noting that the
constitutionality of the rule had not been raised by either side).
77. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
78. 222 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000).
79. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905 n.15.
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conclusive effect of Christie.”80 The Anastasoff court never
asked for briefing on the potential impact of Weisbart.81
On rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit vacated its
decision as moot after the IRS paid Anastasoff’s claim and
announced its “acquiescence . . . in the rule of Weisbart . . . and .
. . abandonment of its previous position based on Christie.”82
Thus, “[t]o put it bluntly, the Eighth Circuit’s sua sponte
decision on the precedential value of unpublished opinions in
Anastasoff was an enormous waste of judicial resources.”83
2. R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of County of
Montgomery84
Another sua sponte appellate court action appears in R & J
Holding, which arose out of a vacated eminent domain
proceeding first filed in 199685 and eventually settled in 2014.86
R & J successfully resisted the condemnation in state court,
asserting that the Authority had unlawfully delegated eminent
domain power to a developer.87 R & J and a related party later
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80. Id.
81. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 286 n.213.
82. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055–56 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
83. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 286 n.213. Milani and Smith argue that
“Anastasoff shows that courts should consider the efficient use of judicial resources before
issuing sua sponte decisions.” Id. It should be noted, however, that some types of sua
sponte actions, such as those on jurisdictional grounds, can help conserve judicial
resources. See Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(suggesting that “enforce[ing] a strict notice requirement with regard to sua sponte
dismissals . . . and mandate[d] reversal for noncompliance with procedural steps dictated
by the court” if the plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim “can only lead to a waste of
judicial resources”); but cf. Hogan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 961 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d
Cir. 1992) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (opining that dismissal of appeal on jurisdictional grounds
wasted judicial resources because it would “likely require two full, virtually identical trials
in the district court”).
84. 670 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2011).
85. Id. at 423–24 (summarizing history and characterizing case as “the latest action in a
long series of disputes”).
86. See Order at 1, R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013) (No.
06-1671) (directing mediation on remand after appeal). Author Offenkrantz was counsel to
the developer defendants in R & J Holding, which was settled after this order sent the
parties to mediation.
87. Id. at 424–25 (noting that agreements between Authority and developer “provided
that Authority could initiate condemnation proceedings . . . only when directed to do so,”
and referring to state-court finding that Authority had given developer “power to determine
whether and when to condemn”).
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unsuccessfully sued the developer and the Authority in federal
court, asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim that was
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds as not yet ripe.88 In further
proceedings seeking damages against only the Authority, they
filed inverse-condemnation proceedings in state court,89 but
purported at trial and on appeal to “reserve” their Fifth
Amendment takings claims for federal court.90 After nearly ten
years of litigation, the state court eventually held that R & J was
not entitled to compensatory damages.91
R & J brought the reserved takings claim to federal court,
where the defendants asserted that it was barred and moved to
dismiss.92 R & J argued that good-faith reliance on England v.
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners93 should allow the
claim to survive,94 but the court noted that R & J knew that the
claim could have been raised in state court, and granted the
motion to dismiss.95 On appeal, a sharply divided Third Circuit
conducted its own research into claim splitting under state law
instead of either certifying the question to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court or requesting supplemental briefs, and held that
the plaintiffs’ attempted England reservation “provided notice to
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88. R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth., No. Civ.A. 02–CV–09530–L, 2003 WL
22387034, at *3–*6 (E.D. Pa. 2003 Oct. 15, 2003).
89. See Brief of Appellees and Cross Appellants at 2, R& J Holding Co. v. Redev.
Auth., 885 A.2d 643 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (Nos. 0217 CD 2005 & 0352 CD 2005)
[hereinafter Appellee/Cross Appellant Brief]. They lost again. See R & J Holding, 885
A.2d at 647 (holding that “[p]laintiffs are not entitled to the damages they seek”).
90. See, e.g., Appellee/Cross Appellant Brief, supra note 89, at *3 n.1 (“Plaintiffs
reserve their right . . . to pursue any claims under the Takings Clause . . . in the federal
court.”).
91. R & J Holding, 670 F.3d at 426 (noting that the state court “held that the [state
statute] does not entitle a prevailing condemnee to compensatory damages”).
92. Id.
93. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
94. R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth., 2009 WL 4362567, at *6–*7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1,
2009) (acknowledging R & J’s reliance on England, but characterizing federal takings
claim as indistinguishable from takings claim raised and decided in state court), rev’d, R &
J Holding, 670 F.3d 420, 433 (holding plaintiffs “entitled to a federal forum for their
federal claims”).
95. R & J Holding, 2009 WL 4362567 at *6, *7 n.6 (stating that “[p]laintiffs are
attempting to re-litigate their takings claim under the federal Constitution—a claim that is
not distinct from that litigated under Pennsylvania’s state Constitution—by claiming an
England reservation,” and characterizing purported England reservation as a “nullity”
because “[a]bsent . . . underlying jurisdiction in federal court, there was no basis upon
which to invoke a reservation”).
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Defendants of Plaintiffs’ intent to split their state and federal
claims”; that “Defendants’ failure to object constitute[d] implied
consent under Pennsylvania law”;96 and that privity bound the
developer defendants to the Authority’s silent acquiescence in
that action.97
This sua sponte action by the Third Circuit had real-life
consequences. It endorsed second-bite proceedings likely to
“deplete the already scarce . . . resources available to cashstrapped state and local governments,” which is likely to
“frustrate government planning efforts and community
development” and “chill appropriate land-use regulation by
states, counties, and local municipalities.”98
3. Poyner v. Loftus99
Appellate courts acting sua sponte and without the benefits
of the adversarial system can and do make serious errors about
their jurisdiction’s own laws too, as typified by Poyner. The
plaintiff, a legally blind man, suffered injuries when he fell from
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96. R & J Holding, 670 F.3d at 428–29.
97. Id. at 428 n.5 (concluding that “[e]ither they are in privity and are bound by the
Authority’s implied consent, or they are not in privity and lack standing to assert the
defense of claim preclusion”), 428–29. Yet the plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief did not
assert that the R & J defendants consented to a reservation and no developer defendant was
a party to any proceeding in which an England reservation was claimed. See Brief for
Appellants at 29–30, R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth., 670 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2011) (No.
10-1047), 2010 WL 3048269, at *29–*30; Appellee/Cross Appellant Brief, supra note 89,
at *3 n.1, *4–*5 (reserving federal takings claim and describing procedural history); see
also Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Regulatory Takings, 45 URB. LAW. 769,
798 (2013) (critiquing decision).
98. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Natl. League of Cities, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Redev. Auth. v. R & J Holding Co., ___ U.S. ___, 132
S. Ct. 2792 (2012) (No. 11-1234). It also created a circuit split. Compare R & J Holding,
670 F.3d at 428 (“Regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ statement was valid as an England
reservation, it provided notice to Defendants of Plaintiffs’ intent to split their state and
federal claims.” (citation omitted)), with, e.g., Edwards v. City of Jonesboro, 645 F.3d
1014, 1020 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Edwards did not avoid claim preclusion through the
reservation of federal rights . . . filed in the state-court action [because] there is no
exception to the full faith and credit statute under which property owners may reserve their
federal rights for a later federal suit. . . . [A]nd it follows that Edwards’s claims are
precluded.” (citations omitted)).
99. 694 A.2d 69 (D.C. 1997). Milani and Smith discuss this case in detail, using it as an
example of the sort of mistake that can occur when an appellate court decides an issue sua
sponte. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 259–61.
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an elevated walkway.100 The plaintiff was using neither a seeingeye dog nor a cane.101 The defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing among other things that the plaintiff “had
been contributorily negligent as a matter of law.”102 The trial
court granted the defendants’ motion, “conclud[ing] that this
was one of those rare cases in which contributory negligence—a
defense with respect to which the defendants had the burden of
proof—had been established as a matter of law.”103
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that “it is reasonable for a
legally blind person . . . as a response to his name being called,
[to] turn towards the direction of his caller, reach for the handle
and continue his step towards the door.”104 The D.C. Court of
Appeals sua sponte broadened this specific question of
reasonable behavior into the more general question of whether
“on account of [the plaintiff’s] visual impairment, his conduct
should be tested against a different standard of care.”105
Examining the issue sua sponte and finding no controlling
caselaw,106 the court applied a rule from other jurisdictions
holding a blind person contributorily negligent as a matter of
law if he was not walking with either a guide dog or a cane, and
consequently affirmed the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.107 But the court completely ignored the fact that the
District of Columbia had passed a “white cane law,” stating that
a blind person’s failure to use a cane or guide dog could not be
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 69 Side B
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100. Poyner, 694 A.2d at 69–70 (summarizing facts).
101. Id. at 70, 73.
102. Id. at 70.
103. Id. at 71 (paraphrasing conclusions of trial court).
104. Id. (quoting the appellant) (emphasis in original).
105. Id.; Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 260 (reporting that, “[f]rom this argument,
the appellate court raised a more general issue that was neither raised nor argued by the
parties”). The court noted that “[t]he parties have cited no authority on this issue.” Poyner,
694 A.2d at 71.
106. Poyner, 694 A.2d at 71 (“The parties have cited no authority on this issue, and we
have found no applicable case law in the District of Columbia.”).
107. Id. at 72–73 (considering Smith v. Sneller, 26 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1942), a case in which
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed a situation similar to that in Poyner); accord
Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 260.
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used as evidence of contributory negligence, in 1972—a full
twenty-five years before Poyner was decided.108
B. Courts Making Sua Sponte Decisions Can
Also Deprive Litigants of Procedural Due Process
The due process implications of sua sponte appellate court
decisionmaking have been discussed at length by others.109
However, the importance of procedural due process to litigants,
especially those who fall subject to the Gorilla Rule, means that
the topic warrants further discussion here. This section thus
provides an overview of the issue that will support a discussion
of reforms intended to protect procedural due process when
courts act sua sponte.
Procedural due process requires that “deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”110
The Supreme Court has held that, in most cases, “a meaningful
opportunity to be heard requires that the hearing occur before
the decision is made.”111 Appellate court actions are
“governmental actions that are subject to these due process
guarantees.”112
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108. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 260–61 (describing the history of white-cane
laws, quoting the relevant statute, and noting that the statute “is not discussed or even cited
in the Poyner opinion, which suggests that the court completely overlooked it”).
109. See, e.g., Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 262–71; Miller, supra note 12, at 1289–
96.
110. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); accord.
Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 263; Miller, supra note 12, at 1289–90; see also
Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (“The core of due process is the right to
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (citation omitted)); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is
required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” (citations omitted)).
111. Miller, supra note 12, at 1289. The Court has in fact “put the judicial thumb firmly
on the side of predeprivation court hearings before a seizure.” Id. at 1290 (discussing
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993)).
112. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 263; see also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (“The violation [of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] is none the less clear when [a] result is accomplished by the state
judiciary in the course of construing an otherwise valid state statute. The federal guaranty
of due process extends to state action through its judicial . . . branch of government.”
(citation omitted)); cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 714 (2010) (plurality opinion) (noting, in a takings-clause case, that “[o]ur
precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial
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Appellate courts contravene due process protections when
they decide substantive issues sua sponte, because in doing so
they can deprive a party of life, liberty, or property without
giving notice or allowing a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on the dispositive issues.113 Indeed, many commentators,114 as
well as state115 and federal courts,116 take this position. The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether
sua sponte appellate court decisions violate due process,117 but it
has addressed related points.118
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branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary” (citation
omitted)).
113. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 263; see Miller, supra note 12, at 1290.
114. See, e.g., Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 262–71 (arguing that appellate court
sua sponte decisions are “inconsistent with fundamental principles of due process”); Miller,
supra note 12, at 1297 (“The Court’s analyses in Mathews v. Eldridge and United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property are fully applicable to sua sponte appellate decisions.”);
Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting the Unrepresented at
the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of Indigent
Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653, 694 (2006) (“Deciding ‘new’
issues not briefed and fully argued is inconsistent with guaranteeing fundamental due
process and fairness to litigants and interested parties.” (citation omitted)); see also D.
Scott Crook, Affirming the Untested—Affirming a Trial Court Based on Issues Raised Sua
Sponte, 14 UTAH B.J. 10, 12 (Oct. 2001) (arguing that appellate courts should
“unequivocally prohibit sua sponte consideration of issues not raised below” outside of
limited exceptions); Vestal, supra note 65, at 493 (“When the appellate court considers a
matter sua sponte for the first time, it means that the litigants have not been given an
opportunity to consider the matter and urge arguments in support of and against the
position adopted by the reviewing court.”).
115. See, e.g., Blumberg Assocs., 311 Conn. at 848 (stating that a threshold requirement
when a reviewing court raises an issue sua sponte is that “the parties are given an
opportunity to be heard on the issue”); Turner v. Flournoy, 594 S.E.2d 359, 362 (Ga. 2004)
(“[T]he parties are blind-sided when an appellate court reaches an issue on its own motion.
They have no inkling that the court even thought about such an issue until they receive and
read the court’s opinion. That is not fair.”); Curry, 931 P.2d at 1136–37.
116. See, e.g., Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that district
court committed reversible error when it dismissed claims sua sponte “without giving
plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard”); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74
F.3d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“We have found that sua sponte dismissals
without [notice of the court’s intent to do so and an opportunity to respond] conflict with
our traditional adversarial system principles by depriving the losing party of the
opportunity to present arguments against dismissal and by tending to transform the district
court into a proponent rather than an independent entity.” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
117. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 263–64; Miller, supra note 12, at 1290.
Brinkerhoff-Faris may be the case that “most closely addresses” this issue, and it “did not
hold that sua sponte decisions by appellate courts generally violate due process.” Milani &
Smith, supra note 13, at 264 n.99.
118. E.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 1290–93 (discussing cases).
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119. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
120. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
121. Miller, supra note 12, at 1290.
122. Id.; see supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text; see also Turner, 594 S.E.2d at
362 (“[W]hen we decide an issue sua sponte, we invite error because the issue has not been
fleshed out fully; it has not been researched, briefed and argued by the parties.”).
123. See generally supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text (discussing Anastasoff).
124. 529 U.S. 460 (2000).
125. Miller, supra note 12, at 1291–92 (analyzing Nelson); see also Nelson, 529 U.S. at
471 (pointing out that “judicial predictions about the outcome of hypothesized litigation
cannot substitute for the actual opportunity to defend that due process affords every party
against whom a claim is stated”).
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In Mathews v. Eldridge,119 the Court laid down a threefactor test for determining the amount of due process required in
a particular situation. The factors are (1) “the private interest
that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”120
Applying the Mathews factors to sua sponte appellate court
decisions compels the conclusion that they can violate due
process. Parties have a strong private interest in the result of
litigation, and a sua sponte decision denies them the opportunity
to pursue this interest.121 As Poyner demonstrates, a court acting
sua sponte has a higher probability of reaching an erroneous
result because it must make a decision without the benefit of the
litigants’ views.122 Providing notice and an opportunity to be
heard when raising an issue sua sponte—by, for example,
ordering supplementary briefing—would not substantially
increase the fiscal and administrative burden on the court.
Indeed, cases like Anastasoff suggest that it might lead to a
decreased use of judicial resources.123
Also apposite is Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,124 in which the
Court held that a district court violated due process when it
“added a defendant and entered judgment without giving the
defendant an opportunity to file a responsive pleading.”125 The
Court further stated that the “opportunity to respond” is
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“fundamental to due process,”126 and that “a prospective party
cannot fairly be required to answer an amended pleading not yet
permitted, framed, and served.”127 Appellate courts’ sua sponte
decisions are analogous to the district court’s amended judgment
in Nelson and therefore also violate due process,128 because,
[j]ust like the defendant in Nelson, the losing party in an
appeal decided sua sponte only learns of the legal theory
deemed controlling by the court when judgment is entered
and never has an opportunity to rebut the court’s reasoning
129
on whether, or how, that theory should apply.

V. RECOMMENDED CHANGES
Something must be done in order to both mitigate the
negative consequences associated with sua sponte decisions and
provide litigants with stronger due process protections. At the
same time, any solution must take into account the fact that there
are instances in which sua sponte actions may be warranted.130
The authors first propose, in the interest of aiding
accountability, that courts should state when they act sua sponte.
Courts very rarely reveal in their opinions when they act sua
sponte.131 Indeed,
[w]hen an appellate court decides a case upon matters not
urged by the litigants in that court, it may simply avoid
mention of the shift in the basis . . . . Unless there is a
dissenting opinion noting the fact, only the attorneys for the
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 71 Side B
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126. Nelson, 529 U.S. at 466.
127. Id. at 467.
128. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 270.
129. Id. at 270; see also Vestal, supra note 65, at 493 (pointing out that sua sponte action
“means that the litigants have not been given an opportunity to consider the matter and
urge arguments in support of and against the position adopted by the reviewing court”).
130. It is, for example, widely accepted that courts have the power to raise sua sponte
subject matter jurisdiction and similar “prudential issues that are related to the courts’
power to act and related issues such as standing, capacity, and ripeness.” Miller, supra note
12, at 1280.
131. Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 313–14 (noting that “most courts that raise issues
sua sponte neither declare that they are doing so nor attempt to justify making a decision
without input from the parties,” and that “a study of 112 decisions issued by a state
supreme court during a one-year period showed that sixteen of the opinions ruled on issues
not raised by the parties, but only three of the cases (two majority and one dissenting
opinion) mentioned this”) (footnote omitted).
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litigants will be aware that the court has decided the case on
132
issues not argued to the court.

This raises a serious conundrum in light of both the Court’s
indication in Hohn that decisions reached without full briefing
and argument have a lower precedential value than others and
Justice Souter’s concurrence in Church of the Lukumi suggesting
that such decisions may not be fully precedential.133 Parties (or,
indeed, courts raising an issue sua sponte) will have trouble
arguing that a sua sponte decision should be entitled to less
precedential weight if they have no indication that the decision
was made sua sponte.134 This article’s first recommendation
therefore is that appellate courts should explicitly note in their
opinions when they decide an issue sua sponte.135
Because there are serious procedural due process concerns
when a court raises and decides issues sua sponte, the parties
must receive notice and an opportunity for comment when it
occurs. Yet Singleton and Exxon Shipping indicate the Supreme
Court’s continued desire to give courts broad discretion to raise
issues sua sponte. The authors believe that the best way to
provide stronger due process protections to parties, reduce the
frequency of errors, and keep the judicial system operating
squarely within the adversarial model without overly cabining
appellate courts’ discretion, would be amending the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure136 to provide that
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132. Vestal, supra note 65, at 497 (footnote omitted).
133. Supra notes 44–56 and accompanying text.
134. See Milani & Smith, supra note 13, at 307, 313 (urging litigants to assert that sua
sponte decisions should be given lesser deference, and noting that “[c]ounsel will only be
able to argue that a sua sponte decision is entitled to less weight as precedent if they know
the case was decided in that manner”).
135. Milani and Smith argue that, if appellate courts do not do so, then “dissenting
and/or concurring judges and justices should indicate this in their opinions.” Milani &
Smith, supra note 13, at 314–15.
136. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. note (indicating that Rule 32.1, which had
no predecessor in the Rules, was adopted to “address[] the citation of judicial opinions . . .
that have been designated by a federal court as ‘unpublished’”). That Rule replaced
inconsistent local standards regarding the citation of unpublished or non-precedential
opinions. Id. The addition proposed here would encourage uniformity among the federal
courts of appeals by filling a similar gap in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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[n]o Judgment or Order of a District Court appealed to a
Court of Appeals shall be reversed, affirmed, or modified
by the Court of Appeals on grounds other than those
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briefed or argued by the parties, without affording the
parties the opportunity to address the issue in such manner
as the Court of Appeals deems appropriate.137

A court could satisfy a rule of this type, and thus safeguard
due process, in one of several ways. One widely endorsed
method is to require supplemental briefing. The Supreme Court
indicated in Trest a preference for supplementary briefing when
an appellate court raises a new issue sua sponte.138 Numerous
state courts and federal appellate courts have endorsed the use of
supplemental briefing as well.139
Ordering supplemental briefing when raising an issue sua
sponte should be the norm, as it would provide significantly
stronger due process protections than would an appellate court
simply issuing a decision sua sponte. By definition,
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137. Professor Martineau proposed a more general rule that “an issue not originally
raised in the trial court [should] be raised on appeal if, under the law of the jurisdiction, the
issue could be a basis for relief long after the judgment is final.” Martineau, supra note **,
at 1060. That proposed rule has influenced some courts considering when to raise an issue
sua sponte. See, e.g., Essinger v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir.
2008) (“We do not adopt [Martineau’s] rule here, but we find a proposed requirement for
such a system to be useful in our evaluation: the matter upon which relief is sought was not
known and could not reasonably have been known in time to be raised at trial.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). It may be argued that, in the absence of a rule or a
definitive decision, there would be nothing to prevent a federal appellate court from acting
sua sponte. See generally Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing sua sponte action in context of assessing relative
power of parties and courts to control litigation). Professor Sloan raised the desirability of
enacting rules that formalize and clarify the standards governing informal en banc review.
Sloan, supra note 12, at 764–71. Similarly, other commentators have advocated adopting a
local rule in the Second Circuit that would set forth the mini en banc procedure, and
provide notice to the litigants when mini en banc review is initiated, thereby avoiding sua
sponte action by the court. Witzel & Groner, supra note 12, at 8.
138. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Kannikal v. Att’y Gen., 776 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2015) (justifying
raising an issue sua sponte by noting that the court “ordered two rounds of supplemental
briefing” and discussed the matter not raised below “extensively at oral argument”);
Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 837 (10th Cir. 2014)
(noting that “it would have been better if we had requested supplemental briefing” in a
prior case); United States v. Godbolt, 345 F. App’x 881, 882 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
district court did not abuse its discretion when it added a sentencing enhancement sua
sponte because it allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefing); Thomas v. Crosby,
371 F.3d 782, 802 (11th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the “preferred method” includes
“requesting supplemental briefing from the parties and permitting oral argument” (citing
Milani & Smith and Miller)); Blumberg Assocs., 311 Conn. at 867–69; Turner, 594 S.E.2d
at 362 n.2 (“At the very least, the parties should be given an opportunity to brief an issue
which this Court decides sua sponte.”).
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supplemental briefing gives litigants an opportunity to be heard
on an issue, and is thus fair to all parties.140 Supplemental
briefing also reduces the possibility of error because the court
has the benefit of the parties’ views.141 By any analysis,
supplemental briefing would not “substantially impair a court’s
interest in efficiency.”142
An alternative including similar due process protections
would be remanding an issue raised sua sponte for resolution by
the lower court,143 which is arguably the only approach “fully
consistent with the usual rule that issues not raised below will
not be considered on appeal.”144 Furthermore, the district court
“may have useful light to shed on the issue.”145
A third option is for federal courts of appeals to certify
questions of state law which have been raised sua sponte. Most
states allow at least some federal courts to certify a question to
the state’s highest court “to avoid the often difficult and timeconsuming process of researching and predicting the outcome of
unresolved state law questions.”146 Parties may request
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140. Cf. Miller, supra note 12, at 1297 (arguing that “the principles of fairness” upon
which due process is based indicate that “[a]n appellate court should always ask for the
parties’ submissions before ruling”) (footnote omitted).
141. See id. at 1290 (pointing out that sua sponte decisions “increase the possibility for
error by a court because the court does not have the benefit of the parties’ views”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1300; see, e.g., City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 726 F.3d
767, 772–73 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that the parties failed to raise two obvious issues,
refusing to decide them because “the parties failed to develop these issues sufficiently for
our review,” and choosing remand as “the best course of action”), appeal after remand,
751 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
144. Miller, supra note 12, at 1300; see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120 (noting that
Singleton had “never been heard in any way on the merits of the case”).
145. Miller, supra note 12, at 1300.
146. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to
State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 158–59 (2003)
(collecting relevant state laws); accord Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of
Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1689–90
(2003) (discussing “pure diversity cases in which unsettled questions of state law are
presented, no substantial state interests are implicated, and no issue of federal law lurks, for
which certification may be justified” (footnote omitted)). Some state certification
procedures allow only certain federal courts to certify questions. Nash, supra this note, at
1690 n.74 (analyzing various situations). Only North Carolina does not accept certified
questions from at least some federal courts. See Cochran, supra this note, at 159 n.13
(noting that in 2003, only “Arkansas, New Jersey, and North Carolina [had] no state law
certification procedures”); see also, e.g., ARK. R. S. CT. & ARK. CT. APP. 6-8 (allowing
certified questions from “a federal court of the United States”); N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1
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certification, but federal courts have the power to invoke
certification without being asked to do so, having “final
discretion over whether or not to employ certification.”147 But
state high courts have the discretion to accept or reject certified
questions.148 “[M]odern federal courts generally agree that they
are bound to follow state court responses to certified
questions.”149 Some federal courts of appeals, notably the
Second Circuit, routinely certify questions to state high
courts.150
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(allowing certified questions from Third Circuit). Compare R & J Holding, 670 F.3d at 428
(noting that court’s decision “relies solely on [its] interpretation of Pennsylvania claim
preclusion law,” and indicating court’s assessment that “failure to object constitutes
implied consent under Pennsylvania law” and its conclusion that claim splitting was
permitted under Pennsylvania law) with Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,
793 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (certifying question to Washington Supreme Court)
and Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2015 Ark. 321 (Ark. 2015) (accepting certified question
from federal court in Arkansas).
147. Nash, supra note 146, at 1692. Federal courts “will consider numerous factors”
when deciding whether to certify a question, in particular “the degree to which state law on
the issue in question is unclear and difficult to predict,” and the “posture of the parties.” Id.
at 1692 n.77. To use R & J Holding as an example, given Pennsylvania’s stated policy
against claim splitting unless the parties and the court “agree on that method of
adjudicating the action,” Keystone Bridge Corp. v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 360 A.2d
191, 196 n.10 (Pa. 1976); see also Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, 449 F.3d
542, 551 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting Pennsylvania courts’ “long-standing disapproval of claim
splitting”), the question of what constitutes permissible claim splitting and acquiescence in
a split—and the coordinate question of what constitutes objection and court approval—
would have been appropriate for certification to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
148. Nash, supra note 146, at 1693; see also Cochran, supra note 146, at 169–70 (noting
that, of fifty-five cases “certified to and addressed by” the Ohio Supreme Court between
July 1, 1988, and Dec. 31, 2001, it “resolved nine by dismissal, declined to answer ten, and
issued an order or opinion in answer to thirty-six”).
149. Nash, supra note 146, at 1695 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court specifically
endorsed the certification procedure in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212
(1960), complimenting the Florida Legislature for its “rare foresight” in enacting a
certification statute. Id.
150. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 392, 397, 397 n.143 (2000) (noting
passage of certification law in 1986, indicating that the Second Circuit certified forty-four
questions to the New York Court of Appeals between 1986 and 2000, and pointing out that,
while the average number of questions certified by the federal courts of appeals between
1990 and 1994 was 14.8, the Second Circuit certified thirteen questions over that period to
the New York Court of Appeals alone); cf. Gregory L. Acquaviva, Certification of
Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third Circuit’s Experience,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 377, 400 (2010) (noting that the Third Circuit had certified eleven
cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania between 2000 and 2010).
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Certification of a question raised sua sponte provides
significantly more due process protection to litigants than does
making a decision sua sponte, and is thus preferable to it. When
a state court accepts a question, the parties have the opportunity
to brief and argue the issue before that court.151 There is no
possibility for the court to reach an erroneous result—indeed, it
is paradoxical that the highest court of a state, often said to be
“the definitive authority of the law of that state,”152 could ever
erroneously interpret its own state’s laws.153 Although it would
arguably take longer to reach a resolution through use of the
certification process,154 certification appears to provide far more
due process protection than does issuing a decision sua sponte.
The federal courts of appeals should in consequence consider
certifying questions of state law that they raise sua sponte.155
VI. CONCLUSION
In this era when Justices of the Supreme Court invite cases
posing issues that they would like to hear,156 when appellate
courts’ raising issues not presented by the parties is common
practice,157 and when appellate courts feel the obligation to “get
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151. Nash, supra note 146, at 1744 (“Attorneys for the parties submit briefs to and
present arguments before the state court.”) (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 1680.
153. But it is of course possible for a state high court to make a mistake by, for example,
inadvertently overlooking relevant state law. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 100–08,
supra (discussing Poyner).
154. The authors could find no studies comparing the temporal and financial costs of
using the certification process with those incurred when the court to raise the issue decides
it sua sponte. Although “certification costs, both temporal and monetary, are not
insignificant,” only “a minority of commentators suggests that the procedure’s costs
outweigh its benefits” in a more general context. Nash, supra note 146, at 1697; see also
Jeffrey G. Weil & Lezlie Madden, 3rd Circuit Case Illustrates Certification Procedure’s
Efficiency, 242 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 5 (July 9, 2010) (“[C]ertification provides parties
the opportunity to save . . . substantial legal fees. [It is also] an efficient use of state
resources both financially and with regard to judicial economy.”).
155. The authors take no position on the merits of certification in this context versus
those of ordering supplemental briefing or remanding to the trial court level. They
acknowledge, however, that certification would not be available in nearly as many
instances as would ordering supplemental briefing. See supra notes 138–42 and
accompanying text.
156. See Liptak, supra note 57.
157. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 52, and accompanying text (analyzing Kiobel).
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it right” irrespective of the parties’ arguments, suggestions of
judicial activism have become commonplace.158 This perception
is exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on sua
sponte appellate court actions, and the continued application of
the Gorilla Rule.159
“Blindsided” is not a word ordinarily heard in the context
of appellate review. But it is precisely the assertion sometimes
made by the aggrieved party (or, in the case of Judge Scheindlin,
a federal judge) when an appellate court raises and decides
matters sua sponte. This startling situation suggests that the
bench and bar should work to mitigate the negative effects of
sua sponte actions, to afford procedural due process to all
parties, and to provide notice to those who later rely on cases
decided by appellate courts acting sua sponte.
Respect for the appellate process requires no less.
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158. See, e.g., DAMON ROOT, OVERRULED: THE LONG WAR FOR CONTROL OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 8 (2014) (arguing that there is today a “long war between judicial
restraint and judicial action” that “cuts across the political spectrum in surprising ways”);
Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by Republican Dissatisfaction,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/07/29/negative
-views-of-supreme-court-at-record-high-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction (discussing in
depth popular perception of Supreme Court, including belief that few Justices set aside
their political views when deciding cases); see generally LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA
MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2015)
(discussing in detail recent Roberts Court rulings of political importance).
159. See supra notes 26 & 30, and accompanying text.

